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THE "VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE" AND
"THE RIGHT To DEATH": SOME
REFLECTIONS ON CRUZAN AND RONALD
DWORKIN
Hiram H. Lesar Distinguished Lecture,
24 September 1992
John Finnis*
These reflections focus on three members (one professor and
two alumni) of my Oxford college. Though University College offi-
cially bears the name The Great Hall of the University of Oxford,
it is only one of that university's 30 colleges, and not a particularly
large one-only about 450 students and teaching fellows like myself.
My title's focus on one named law professor may already seem
narrow. How then, you may wonder, can adding two more names
from the same little institution in England make this lecture less
parochial, and more relevant to Southern Illinois?
I
The narrow legal issue before the United States Supreme Court
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health' was no more
than: Is Missouri entitled to require "clear and convincing evidence"
before allowing the withdrawal of food and water from a comatose
patient, that is, "clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence"
that the patient would have wished life-sustaining measures to be
withdrawn, or wished that such measures would be withdrawn if he
or she were later to be in a condition such as he or she actually is
now in?
* Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, University of Oxford; Fellow of University
College, Oxford.
I. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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The five Justices comprising the majority say Yes; the minority
say No. The minority contends that a state cannot require "clear
and convincing, inherently reliable evidence" of those wishes; states
can require no more than "reliable evidence" of such wishes. As
one reads the minority judgments, however, one is struck by their
calm, tacit assumption that there was clear and convincing evidence;
they read as if their authors knew what Nancy Cruzan's wishes and
interests were.
Be that as it may, the premises for the minority judgments'
rejection of the State's requirement of "clear and convincing evi-
dence" are three propositions, two expressed and one implied:
(1) that one has a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and
a right to be free from the indignities involved in being comatose
(or very ill, "steeped in decay" per Brennan J.),2 and
(2) that one will be denied those rights and interests if there is any
significant hurdle to the withdrawal of food and water--together
with the implied proposition
(3) that there are, on the other side, no significant rights or interests
calling for protection by such a hurdle or onus of proof, because a
comatose person has no interest in life, or her life has expired
(Stevens J.),3 or her life is of no legitimate interest to the State "until
it is established that this [providing life-saving treatment] represents
her choice" (Brennan J.). 4 The implication of this third premise of
the minority is that the State should stand neutral between choosing
to sustain human life and choosing precisely to suppress it, neutral
as between choosing what is humanly speaking a bad (in this case,
death) and choosing an instance of a substantive and very basic
human good (in this case, life).
Such demands for neutrality are of far-reaching importance. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 the Court (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter JJ) 6 repeatedly claims the authority of a line of cases upholding
a right described as: to make choices central to one's personal
autonomy. The line of Supreme Court decisions named begins in
1923 with Meyer v. Nebraska, and runs through Pierce v. Society of
Sisters in 1925, Skinner v. Oklahoma in 1941, and the dissenting
2. Id. at 309.
3. Id. at 351.
4. Id. at 317.
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
6. Souter J. is an alumnus of a college 200 yards down the High Street from mine.
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judgment of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman in 1961, before reaching
Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, and Eisenstadt v. Baird in 1971,
shortly before Roe v. Wade7 in 1973. But a historian, or a foreigner,
reading these cases in sequence can instantly see that the decisions
before 1965 utterly reject the conception that the state, or the law,
must stand neutral before choices involving the fostering and respect-
ing or harming and contemning of great human goods, such as
education in good and useful knowledge (in the cases from the
1920s), or procreation within marriage (in Skinner in 1941), or
marriage itself (in Harlan's notable dissent in 1961 and even, still,
just, in Griswold itself).
True, what those cases all have in common with the post-1965
cases down to Casey itself is that they identify implicit or textually
unspecified constitutional rights and immunities. But quite unlike the
later cases, they do so by reference to goods central to a human
person's and community's existence, and honored in the traditions
of your community (and mine): knowledge as opposed to ignorance,
conjugal procreation as opposed to sterility, conjugal intercourse as
opposed to casual or uncommitted sex. With all this the Court broke
in Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 by assuming a double symmetry (or neu-
trality): (i) what is true of sexual relations that express and support
a mutual commitment which makes possible a good environment for
the emergence and development of children must equally, and obvi-
ously, be true of even the most casual one-night stand; and (ii) what
is true of the decision to try to have a child must be true of the
decision not to have a child. There is just a single neutral category:
"the decision [of the individual, whether married or single] ...
whether to bear or beget a child." 9 The key word is "whether."
What matters, according to the new, unprecedented,' 0 unargued
doctrine of the Court is the ability to make and give effect to a
decision whether or not to beget or bear a child. Whichever way the
individual's decision goes, the Constitution and the state, if they
favor, recognize, and support one option, must obviously do the
same for the other.
7. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (repeatedly claiming the same lineage).
8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9. 405 U.S. at 453 (Brennan J. for the Court).
10. Unless, that is, we count Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), as is suggested with
some plausibility in GERARD V. BRADLEY, The Constitution and the Erotic Self, FIRST THINGS
28, 30. But Stanley is not cited in the Court's judgment in Caseythough it wins one incidental
mention in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.
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A striking example of this assumption of neutrality between
human goods and bads is the opening sentence of the oral argument
of counsel for the ACLU in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "Whether
our Constitution endows Government with the power to force a
woman to continue or to end a pregnancy against her will is the
central question in the case."" And in due course the Court's
judgment adopts and repeatedly appeals to the same implicit as-
sumption of neutrality: since it is obvious that the state could not
constitutionally force a woman to end a pregnancy against her will
by obliging her to terminate the life within her, it must obviously
and necessarily follow that the state cannot oblige her not to end
that life. Symmetry. Since you must be permitted to choose life, you
must be permitted to choose death. It is as if the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters had said: since
parents have a constitutionally protected right to provide non-State
education for their children if they so choose, they must equally have
the right to decide to give their children no education. The Court's
argument in Casey would have been rejected as absurd at any time
before the mid-sixties. The claim that there is a consistent sequence
of precedents stretching back not 25, but 70 years, is untenable; it
lacks the legal "integrity" that Ronald Dworkin (Professor of Juris-
prudence in Oxford and Fellow of my College) made central to his
general theory of law and legal rights.'
2
Before I reach Ronald Dworkin's treatment of Cruzan and the
supposed legal right to death, I want to underline the radical character
of the basic argument adopted by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Five or six years ago, I had
the opportunity to debate the meaning of autonomy with David A.J.
Richards, Professor of Law at New York University and author of
books such as Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law which argue that all
laws for inhibiting one's chosen forms of sexual behavior, or one's
choice to take drugs (non-addictive or addictive), or one's decision
to kill oneself or to kill someone else at their request, are immoral
and unconstitutional because all such laws violate our fundamental
right to the dignity of autonomy, and flout the state's fundamental
duty to be neutral with regard to the many disparate visions of the
good life. At the time of our debate, 1 wondered whether there was
11. N.Y. TimS, Apr. 23, 1992, at B10. The origins of the argument may be found in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1985) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
12. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Cf. John Finnis, On Reason and Authority
in Law's Empire, 6 LAW AND PHILosoPHY 357-80 (1987).
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really any point in contesting opinions as extreme as his-extreme
even in the hothouse of law school philosophizing. But now the core
of Richards' position is mainstream; it has been embraced by the
Court in Casey:
"[m]atters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life .... [b]eliefs ... [which] define the attributes of
personhood." (Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807)
"These are intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep,
personal character underlay our decisions . ." (Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2808)
"The fundamental right [of persons] .. .to determine the meaning
of their own lives ...13
"a fundamental right to autonomy in deciding whom and how to
love in order to preserve underlying values of personal emotional
integrity and self-expression in intimate relations
' '1 4
In our debate I argued that Richards' claim to be advancing a
conception of autonomy rooted in the sober philosophy of Immanuel
Kant was grotesquely wrong.' 5 But the march of history proceeds
without too much regard for demonstrations of this sort, and the
Supreme Court has now adopted without care or qualification the
central claims or premises of Richards' unrestrained apologia for an
essentially unrestrained right to heroin, sodomy, and suicide.
II
Dworkin's article "The Right to Death,"'' 6 takes a line most like
Justice Stevens': "the life of the permanently vegetative .. . is not
valuable to anyone." "It is not in their interests to live on." Indeed,
continuing to live on is, for them, a net disadvantage; they are better
off dead. "There is no way in which continued life can be good for
such people." Indeed, "it is at least a reasonable view that a
permanently comatose person is, for all that matters, dead already";
the "bodies they used to inhabit" are only "technically alive." And:
13. DAVID A. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 274 (1982).
14. DAVID A. RICHARDS, RIGHTS & AUTONOMY, 92 ETHICS 3, 16 (1981).
15. John M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of 'Duties to Oneself': Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-52 (1987).
16. Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 4, 1991, at
14-17.
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to care for them is to show "pointless and degrading solicitude. '1 7
Now in the same article Dworkin repeatedly affirms the "intrinsic
value of human life."' 8 But he gives the words a new sense: "once
a human life has begun it is terribly important that it goes well."
Thus, the words are meant to convey that there are human lives
which are not going, or are likely not to go, "well enough" to be
worth living. So: words hitherto taken as foundational to the exclu-
sion of, say, abortion, are made to bear a meaning from which "it
sometimes follows that abortion is morally recommended or re-
quired." This "intrinsic value of human life" grounds "the right to
death,"' 9 wherever death would rescue one from something disad-
vantageous to one's "life considered as a whole." 20
III
Before plunging into that thicket of fundamental issues, I should
outline my moral (and legal) position on the practical questions at
stake in cases such as Cruzan. It is a position briefly, and not entirely
adequately, expounded in that case by Justice Scalia, in a passage
quite misunderstood by Dworkin.
The petitioners who wanted to end Nancy Cruzan's life argued
that her death would be different from ordinary suicide on a number
of grounds, 2' one being that she (acting, as they claimed, through
their agency) "would bring on her own death not by any affirmative
act but by merely declining . . . nourishment. 2 2 Justice Scalia points
out that the distinction between action and inaction does not suffice
for, though it has some bearing on, an answer to the question
whether there is suicide. There is suicide whenever there is a conscious
decision to put an end to one's own existence. Just as there can be
murder by starvation, so there can be suicide by starvation or by
sitting on the beach until submerged by the tide or by not shutting
off the engine and getting out of the car after parking in one's
garage. So the intelligent line, Scalia suggests, does not fall between
"action and inaction," but between those forms of inaction that
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id.
20. Cf. id. at 16.
21. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
22. Id.
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consist of abstaining from ordinary care and those that consist of
abstaining from excessive measures. 23
Dworkin fails to understand that what matters is not the pattern
of physical behavior, but the choice which shapes that behavior into
a human action (in the narrow sense of "action") or deliberate
omission (an action in the broad sense). The evidence of this failure
of understanding is in Dworkin's statement that Scalia thinks, "that
a conscious and competent patient who refuses an amputation that
would prolong his life should be treated as a suicide ... ."24 As will
by now be obvious, Justice Scalia does not say that, and is not
committed to it; indeed he implicitly denies it. Along with the central
moral tradition of our civilization, he accepts that it is not suicide
to choose to refuse treatment precisely because it-having the treat-
ment and undergoing its after-effects-is burdensome, and one chooses
to reject the burden. One's death is not chosen, for it is neither
one's end, nor a means to one's end, but a side-effect, foreseen and
accepted (but not intended, not chosen), of one's choice to reject
the burden. Such choices may in certain cases, perhaps many cases,
be unjustified (cowardly, selfish), but need not be suicidal (homi-
cidal).
Someone else, in the same situation, may make a suicidal choice-
reviewing their prospects, they judge that they would rather die than
live, would be better off dead, and choose death by means of refusing
life-sustaining treatment.
Now apply these considerations to the Cruzan problem. Com-
petent persons who envisage the future situation of being comatose,
and who clearly and freely reject food in that situation (should it
ever come about), may, but need not, be choosing to kill themselves.
They may instead be choosing to be merciful to others by forgoing
all expensive care, in order to free others of the burden of the cost
of providing that expensive care for them, and accepting death as a
side-effect (rather than choosing death as a means of relieving others
of the costs, or themselves of a burdensome existence). And if people
who have made and adequately communicated such a non-suicidal
decision become comatose, others can comply with their choice
without assisting in suicide, and without violating human solidarity
with them by abandoning them. For, just in so far as that is a choice
23. Id. at 296-97.
24. Dworkin op. cit. n.16 at 17.
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to comply with their wishes as morally proper, non-suicidal wishes,
it is not a choice of abandonment but an affirmation of their dignity,
and an act of solidarity with them.
Again, in any impoverished society (for example our own soci-
eties after a nuclear attack), other grave obligations could take
priority over the duty to care for the comatose, lest other members
of the community be deprived of necessities. But in an affluent
society, to cease providing food and water to the permanently co-
matose who have never made or communicated a non-suicidal deci-
sion to forgo all care, that is, to abandon them, is to break off
human communion with them and to deny their dignity as persons,
their personhood. Those responsible for making such provision can-
not-logically cannot-exercise mercy on others' behalf by accepting
their death in order to avoid burdening the providers (or others in
an affluent society).
I have just used the word "dignity," a word much used by
Richards and Dworkin, and by the minority Justices in Cruzan.21
Now it is indeed true that indignities which one may undergo, or
undignified aspects of one's dependence in illness, disintegration, and
dying, are real, and really related to one's intrinsic dignity. And it
is true that a comatose person can be subjected to indignities, for
example by being treated as a sex object, or by being dumped into
the garbage, or by being systematically called "a vegetable." But the
rhetoric of Dworkin and the Supreme Court's dignity/autonomy
Justices systematically confuses the emotionally repugnant aspects of
long-term coma (the mess of excrement and so forth), with lack of
human dignity. These distinguished lawyers are offering to speak for
the comatose, but in fact shroud them with dehumanizing epithets
(preparatory, I think we should fear, to justifying the deliberate
termination of their lives). Thus they say that for the comatose "the
burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very
humanity it was meant to serve"; their life is one of degradation;
someone on life support has a "degraded existence." ' 26 All such
remarks, however, confuse the emotional sense of "dignity," "dig-
nified," "undignified," and "indignity" with the rational sense of
"human dignity." For in the latter, essential sense, it is indeed true
that one who helps the comatose, or other severely mentally disabled
25. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 311.
26. Id. (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497
N.E.2d 626, 635-36 (1986)).
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people, is affirming and serving their dignity, and expressing soli-
darity with them as human persons, however gravely disabled.
Still, even discounting the judicial rhetoric, there remains a fair
question: Is such care pointless? Does it at best affirm a value that
is absent, and at worst impose on the object of care still further
disvalue? Is the continued existence of the unconscious or other
severely mentally disabled persons who can no longer do good things
or have good experiences of any benefit to them? Does caring for
them benefit either them or others? Does it maintain human solidarity
with them, or is it just sentimental folly?
IV
Justice Stevens and Dworkin explicitly say, and Justice Brennan
in Cruzan says implicitly, that one's life without cognitive-affective
function, one's mere "biological" or "metabolic" existence, is of no
value, constitutes no benefit, and is probably a burden.27 The position
that a life without cognitive-affective function is valueless is also
held by revisionist theologians like Richard McCormick SJ, who
bluntly says: "life in a P.V.S. is not a benefit or value to the
patient," for there is no benefit without at least minimally conscious
life, and anything else is merely an effect on "some part of the
patient's anatomy," not on the patient.
28
But if that is so, the patient's anatomy and bodily life must be
merely an instrument and an instrumental good, something that
persons have and use for their specifically human or personal pur-
poses, but which remains really distinct from what human persons
are. And, in fact, Stevens and Dworkin draw that conclusion: One
who has only this bodily life has ceased to be as a person, has no
personal interests at stake, and "is for all that matters dead al-
ready." 29
But the great questions, whether life deprived of consciousness
has any value, and whether one's living body is one's person, are
questions to be decided by reason, not by feelings and rhetorically
stirred imagination. When one considers living in a coma, one is
27. The position that it is a burden is articulated by Stevens when he approvingly quotes
a dissenting state supreme court judge's statements that Nancy Cruzan, so far from being
unconscious as all the judgments including Stevens' and Brennan's assert, "may react to pain
stimuli" and may have some "awareness of her surroundings." Id. at 337; compare Id. at
2868 (Brennan), and 2886 (Stevens).
28. "Moral Considerations" Ill Considered, 166 AMERICA 210, 214 (1992).
29. Dworkin, op. cit. n.16 at 17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345-47.
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overwhelmed by the distance between this condition and the integral
good of a flourishing human person. Nobody wants to be in that
condition; no decent person wants anyone to be in it. The good of
human life is very, very imperfectly instantiated in such an existence,
so deprived and so unhealthy. But this does not show that human
life considered in abstraction from all other human goods, such as
play, friendship, and awareness of truth and beauty, is of no intrinsic
goodness. No human good, considered apart from all the others, in
a mode of existence (if it were possible) deprived of all the others,
is appealing. But this does not show that basic human goods, such
as those I have just mentioned, are instrumental, or other than
intrinsically good. No more does the unappealing nature of comatose
life show it to be valueless. For it is the very actuality of one's living
body, and one's living body is one's person.
To deny that one's living body is one's person is to accept some
sort of dualistic theory of human persons, according to which human
beings are inherently disembodied realities who only have their bodies,
only inhabit them and use them. This is clearly the basis on which
Stevens proceeds in Cruzan's case: unconscious, therefore not a
person, therefore not really living.30 In the opening sentence of
Scalia's judgment there is some careless rhetoric about science keeping
"the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person would
want to inhabit it";3" this is dualist talk, but in Scalia's judgment it
remains just that, mere incautious talk.
No such dualism is rationally defensible. For every such dualism
sets out to be a theory of one's personal identity as a unitary and
subsisting self-a self always organically living but only discontinu-
ously conscious, and now and then inquiring and judging, deliberating
and choosing, and employing techniques and instruments to achieve
purposes. But every such dualism renders inexplicable the unity in
complexity that one experiences in every act one consciously does.
We experience this complex unity more intimately and thoroughly
than any other unity in the world; indeed, it is for us the very
paradigm of substantial unity and identity. As I write this, I am the
unitary subject of my fingers hitting the keys, the sensations I feel
in them, the thinking I am articulating, my commitment to write this
paper, my use of the computer to express myself. As I speak it, I
am the unitary subject of the muscular effort in projecting my voice,
30. Id. at 349-51.
31. Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
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of the hearing that voice, of observing your bodily responses, of the
thoughts I am articulating and the thoughts I am not articulating (as
I wonder how it's going across), and the emotions that colour all
this. So the one reality that I am involves at once consciousness and
bodily experience and behavior; and dualism sets out to explain me.
But every dualism ends by denying that there is any one something
of which to be the theory. It does not explain me; it tells me about
two things, one a nonbodily person and the other a nonpersonal
body, neither of which I can recognize as myself. 2 So, one's living
body is intrinsic to one's personal reality. One does not merely
possess, inhabit or use one's body, as one possesses and uses an
instrument or inhabits a dwelling. As St. Thomas Aquinas says: "My
soul is not me [anima mea non est ego]," and "If only my soul is
saved, then neither I nor any human person is saved." 33
But the real issue underlying Cruzan is more radical. For if the
life of the permanently comatose is of no value, or is a disvalue,
and care for them is pointless, what could possibly be wrong with
killing them? Whether or not the standard case of withdrawing food
and water from them is (as I think it is) a case of killing by omission,
why not do what indubitably is deliberate killing, by commission-
give them a lethal injection to end their life "without misery and
fuss" (as is now done on a large scale in The Netherlands)?34
The real issue35 underlying Cruzan is, then: Is killing the per-
manently comatose, or those who can have no more good experiences,
harming them? And we are now in a position to answer. Such
persons can be harmed. They can be harmed by being subjected to
indignities (thrown on the garbage, used as sex objects). And killing
them is another way of harming them. To choose to kill such a
32. See Germain Grisez, Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Provided to Permanently
Comatose and Other Mentally Disabled Persons? 5 IsSuES L. & MED. 165 (1989); JOHN FINNIS,
ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 304-09 (1987)
33. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUPER PRIMAM EPISTOLAM AD CORINTHIOS LECTURA, 15,3; see also his
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I q.75 a.4.
34. For evidence of the grim escalation of voluntary and non-voluntary "active" euthanasia
by medical administration of toxic injections, since 1986, see John Keown, Some Reflections
on Euthanasia in The Netherlands in LUKE GORMALLY (ed.), THE DEPENDENT ELDERLY:
AUTONOMY, JUSTICE AND QUALITY OF CARE 70-100 (1992); Keown, The Law and Practice of
Euthanasia in The Netherlands, 108 L.Q. REV. 51-78 (1992); CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING
DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991).
35. Clearly foreseen and admirably answered in an analysis by William E. May, Germain
Grisez and many others, Catholic, non-Catholic, and non-Christian. William E. May et al.,
Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 IssuEs
L. & MED. 203 (1987).
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person is to choose to harm that person. And so it is inconsistent
with a rational love of that person, and (however much motivated
by feelings of affection and compassed about with thoughts and
words of respect) is inconsistent with respect for, and justice to, the
person. Whatever the feelings of solidarity that may accompany and
suggest such a choice, it is a choice incompatible with a reasonable
solidarity with the person so killed.
And such a choice is made whenever the person's dying is chosen,
however reluctantly, as a means to an end, however good that end,
and whether the chosen means to that means is a matter of com-
mission or omission, of "active" steps or "passive" deliberate non-
provision of the essentials of life.16 All such choices, whatever their
further motivations (often both very understandable and quite up-
right), are choices of death-to destroy life-precisely as such (as a
means). They are not merely an acceptance of death as a side-effect
of some other choice. They are choices of a bad (to destroy an
instance of a basic human good), even when motivated by concern
for some true good.
I have argued above that it is possible to withdraw artificial
feeding and hydration without intending the death of the patient
either as end or as means. But if we consider patients in an affluent
society, patients whose death is not inevitably and truly imminent,
then we should say that the standard case of such withdrawal-
indeed every case where the purpose is something other than to give
effect to the patient's genuine wishes-is a case where the death of
the patient is the chosen means to liberating the patient or the carers
or society at large from the burden of illness and care. Thus every
such case is a case of intending to kill, and killing-that is, in the
nicest possible way, of murdering.
VI
I promised to focus on three members of my College, but have
mentioned only two. Still, the third scarcely needs to be named. As
36. In McCormick's America article, supra note 28, at 23, the truly central question of
intention is immediately muddled into the different question of causation: Was the cause of
death the omission of artificial hydration and nutrition or was it the underlying lethal
pathology? Now, even in terms of physiological causation, McCormick's claim that the death
in such cases is caused solely by the underlying disease or pathology is extremely implausible.
These are not cases of discontinuing a therapy. But the much more important point to make
against McCormick (whose view is not eccentric, but standard amongst dissenting, proportion-
alist professors of Catholic theology) is that the real issue is one of intent. A human act
centrally is what it is intended to be.
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we ask ourselves whether the five Justices who in Casey embraced
the constitutional right to value-neutral, amoral autonomy, the right
that will surely be used to impose the legalization of euthanasia 7 on
all the states, unless one of the five is replaced by someoneof a
different mind, we are obliged to wonder who will have the right to
nominate the next Supreme Court Justice. Will it be the present
incumbent of the Presidency? Or perhaps instead the candidate who
in the immediate aftermath of Casey promised to appoint only
Justices sure to uphold the right to choose3"-the candidate I cannot
but think of as a distinguished alumnus of my college.
37. Non-voluntary as well as voluntary, since the constitutional rights of children, the
insane, and long-term unconscious must be exercised on their behalf "by agents acting with
the best interests of their principals in mind." See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
38. See N. Y. TIMES, 1 July 1992, A15 col. 4; 2 July 1992 A14 col. 2; 4 July 1992 AI0.
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